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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ASSUMIPTION OF LIABILITY BY IMPLICATION
In the case of the National Credit Company v. Casco Company,'
the plaintiff's assignor sold to the Avalon Theatre Company, de-
fendant's lessee, a neon electric sign under a conditional sales
contract. To secure rental payments, defendant secured from the
Theatre Company, its lessee, a chattel mortgage on all the furni-
ture and fixtures owned by the lessee located upon the premises.
Upon default in payment, defendant foreclosed the mortgage and
purchased at the foreclosure sale, defendant receiving from the
sheriff a bill of sale of all the property covered by the chattel
mortgage, including the neon sign. Subsequently, defendant leased
the building with the sign and other property to the Liberty The-
atre Company of Olympia, giving the lessee an option to purchase
after a certain date, if payments of rent were made as provided
in the lease. While the theatre was in the possession of the Liberty
Theatre Company, as lessee, defendant made four separate pay-
ments covering eleven installments due by the terms of the condi-
tional sales contract under which the neon sign had been sold.
Defendant thereafter refused to make any further payments. In
this action the court allowed plaintiff to recover the balance of
the purchase price.
The court found that defendant, as purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, was legally in the same position as an assignee of the rights
of the mortgagor, which is clearly in accord with the weight of
authority 2 The court also found that defendant assumed the
obligations of the contract through an implied in fact promise.
In arriving at tins conclusion that defendant had intended -to-
assume the obligations of the contract, chief reliance was placed
upon defendant's having voluntarily paid the eleven installments
on the conditional sales contract and also on its having leased the
173 Wash. Dec. 182, 22 Pac. (2d) 670 (1933).
2 Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Ann.) (1933) Sec. 1108; First National Bank
v. Woolery, 6 Wash. 215, 33 Pac. 357 (1893) Larson u. Anderson, 97
Wash. 484, 166 Pac. 774 (1917) Gross v. Thomsou's Estate, 286 Ill. 185
121 N. E. 600 (1918).
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sign together with the other property under the lease with option
to purchase. The court said
"Everything that appellant did with regard to the sub-
ject-matter of the contract, up to the commencement of
this action, was consistent only with the theory-and
absolutely inconsistent with any other reasonable theory-
that it had adopted the sales contract." 3
Thus the court from this subsequent conduct finds an implied
in fact promise on the defendant's part to assume the obligations
of the assignor on the contract. It is a well established rule that
even an implied contract requires a meeting of the minds and must
grow out of the intention of the parties. In the instant case it
seems questionable if the intention to assume can be found in the
conduct of the defendant. There was evidence that his payments
were made with an insistence that the duty was not his, a fact
which scarcely indicates an intention to assume the obligation.
His conduct is the normal stop-loss payment, which is not made
with the intention to assume the obligation but to keep the prop-
erty intact. There is probably a serious doubt if the contract, if
it exists, can be supported by any consideration. If there is any,
in the instant case, it might possibly be found in detriment to
plaintiff in that relying on the implied in fact promise, he did not
repossess the sign.
It is true that the language of the court might be interpreted
as basing the decision on estoppel. Thus the court quotes from
the case of Wigns Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co. .
"It is not necessary that a party should deliberately agree
to be bound by the terms of a contract to which he is a
stranger, if, having knowledge of such contract, he delib-
erately enters into relations with one of the parties, which
are only consistent with the adoption of such contract.
If a person conduct himself in such manner as to lead the
other party to believe that he has made a contract his
own, and his acts are only explicable upon that theory,
he will not be permitted afterwards to repudiate any of
its obligations."
Most courts reject the estoppel theory on the ground that there
has been no injury to the obligor, since the assignor is still liable
on the contract, which is all that the obligor contracted for in the
first place, and also since whether or not the assignee is liable to
the obligor, either the assignee or the assignor must perform all
conditions precedent on their side of the contract before the
obligor is bound to perform.5 In the instant case, if estoppel were
'National Credit Company v. Casco Company, note 1, supra, p. 671.
142 U. S. 396, 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 188, 35 L. Ed. 1055 (1892).
5Dahlhjelm; Garages Inc. v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 149 Wash. 184, 270
Pac. 434 (1928) See 2 R. C. L. 625. The great weight of authority refuses
to base an estoppel on voluntary payments made by the assignee. Lisenby
v. Newton, 120 Cal. 571, 52 Pac. 813 (1898) Wilson v. Beazely, 186 Cal.
437, 199 Pac. 772 (1921) Tarpey v. Curran, 67 Cal. App. 575, 228 Pac. 62
(1924) Meyer v. Droegmuellr 165 Minn. 245, 206 N. W 391 (1925)
Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns, Ch. 398 (N. Y. 1822).
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relied upon, injury to the plaintiff seems lacking, unless it could
be found in his failure to repossess the sign because of his reliance
on defendant's conduct.
The general view is that in the absence of an express or implied
in fact promise by the assignee to assume the obligations imposed
on the assignor in the contract, he is not liable for the performance
thereof.6 The American Law Institute's Restatement of Contracts
attempts to go a step further and reach a more equitable view7 It
recognizes the fallacy of human nature of not being explicit, and
so makes it a presumption that, in the absence of circumstances
showing a contrary intention, the assignee should be regarded as
promising to assume the duties as well as taking the rights. This is
what in effect the Washington court is doing, both in this case
and in the case of Great Western Theatre Equspment v. M. & E.
Theatres.8 It is a view which alleviates the hardship on the obligor
of proving that the assignee had promised to perform the duties,
which is often only impliedly intended by the parties, and so is
hard to prove, although it is what the parties would usually natur-
ally desire. This rule which applies to assignees can hardly be
extended to purchasers at foreclosure sales. The assignee can be
said to have intended to assume duties as well as rights, but the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale can scarcely be said to have such
intention. In the latter case the rule is well established that the
purchaser doesn't take the obligation unless he assumes it. Fur-
thermore, in the instant case, the facts surrounding the payment
could be regarded as a circumstance showing an intention not to
assume.
Washington is in accord with all other states in holding that the
assignor remains liable on the contract even after he has assigned
his rights thereunder, in the absence of a novationf Washington
also follows the majority view in allowing the admission of parol
evidence to prove an oral agreement to assume the obligations
of the assignor even when there was a written assignment made
at the time. 0 For this view, the Washington court offers two
C omstock v. Hitt, 37 Ill. 542 (1863) 1 Williston on Contracts, sec.
412; Note, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1929). See Atlantic & N. C. 1. Co. v.
Atlantic & N. C. Co., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E. 185, 188, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.)
225, 125 Am. St. Rep. 550 (1908).
1 Contracts Restatement (official draft), Sec. 164 (2).
8164 Wash. 557, 3 Pac. (2d) 1003 (1931).
°Wooding v. Cram, 10 Wash. 35, 38 Pac. 756 (1894) Johnson V. Nor-
inan, 98 Wash. 331, 167 Pac. 923 (1917) Medgard v. ShvnWgakn, 135 Wash.
527, 238 Pac. 574 (1925), Dej Lano v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273
(1926) Auve v. Wenzeff, 162 Wash. 368, 298 Pac. 686 (1931) Atlantic
& N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., note 6, supra; Contracts Restatement
(official draft), Sec. 160 (4) 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 411, 1 Tiffany,
Landlord and Tenant, 962.
"Don Yook v. Washsngton Mill Co., 16 Wash. 459, 47 Pac. 964 (1897)
Ordway v. Downey, 18 Wash. 412, 51 Pac. 1047, 52 Pac. 228 (1898) Gil-
iorre v. Skookunm Box Factory, 20 Wash. 703, 56 Pac. 934 (1899) Dim-
nckh o. Collins, 24 Wash. 78, 63 Pac. 1101 (1901) Bicknell v. Henry, 69
Wash. 408, 125 Pac. 156 (1912) Harbican v. Skinner, 83 Wash. 596, 145
Pac. 582 (1915) Hart v. Bogle, 88 Wash. 125, 152 Pac. 1010 (1915) Union
Machsnerj &S upply Co. v. Darnell, 89 Wash. 227, 154 Pac. 183 (1916)
Roberts v. Stiltner 101 Wash. 397, 172 Pac. 738 (1918) Bollong -v. Cor-
mnn, 117 Wash. 336, 201 Pac. 297 (1921) Hargs v. Hargzs, 160 Wash. 594,
295 Pac. 742 (1931) Hardinger v. Fullerton, 165 Wash. 483, 5 Pac. (2d)
987 (1931). Contra; Osburn v. Dolan. 7 Wash. 62, 34 Pac. 433 (1893).
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rationalizations which, in effect, are the same, first, that parol
evidence is always admissible to show what the true consideration
is,1' and second, that parol evidence of an oral collateral agree-
ment is admissible.12 In order to be a collateral agreement such
that parol evidence thereof is admissible, it would seem from the
cases that there need only be an additional promise given at the
same time for the same consideration, so, in effect, this rationali-
zation is the same as the first.
Will the Washington court hold the assignee liable when neither
an express nor an implied promise on his part to assume the
assignor's obligations can be raised I There are several statements
by the Washington court to the effect that it will not hold the
assignee liable unless there is an express assumption on his part."
However, the Washington court has never adhered very strictly
to this view, but has, where it thought proper, altered its precept.
It has recognized that an implied in fact promise based on the in-
tention of the parties is just as effective to bind the assignee as an
express promise.' 4 But where the assignment is such that there
is obviously no intention on the part of the parties that the
assignee should assume the obligations under the contract, the
court has refused to raise such an implied in fact promise and
has held the asignee not to be liable for nonperformance of the
duties." It has gone so far as to raise an implied in law promise
in one case, that of the Dahlhjelm Garages Inc. v. Mercantile Ins.
Co., 6 although it may be possible to interpret the case as being
based on a theory of estoppel, but this is an exceptional case. It is
submitted that the view holding the assignee liable to the
obligor on the contract where the intention of the parties is that
the assignee should become a party to the transaction and not
merely be the holder of the assignment as security is the better
and more equitable view
In the purchase at foreclosure sale situations, the same rule
should apply if an intention to assume the obligation can be
found. In view of the holding in the instant case, it seems
advisable for the one making the payment to explicitly state that
he is not, in so doing, assuming the obligation.
LEO D. BLOCH.
"Harbscan. v. Skinner note 10, supra, Roberts v. Stiltner note 10,
supra.
12 Bollong v. Corman, note 10, supra.
11Bmrrose v. Matthews, 78 Wash. 32, 138 Pac. 319 (1914) Hardinger
v. Fullerton, 165 Wash. 483, 5 Pac. (2d) 987 (1931).
11 Chaffee, v. Hawkins, 89 Wash. 130, 154 Pac. 143 (1916) McGill v.
Baker, 147 Wash. 394, 266 Pac. 138 (1928).
"Prescott Co. v. Franklin Tool Works, 117 Wash. 283, 201 Pac. 308
(1931). See McGill v. Baker note 14, supra.
'" Note 5, supra. In this case P bought a Velie automobile from N Co.
to be used as a taxi. N Co. undertook to insure the car against fire,
theft, and collision in its use as a taxi, the sale being under a conditional
sales contract. N Co. took out the proper insurance and through various
mesne conveyances assigned its interest in the contract to D. When the
insurance expired, D took out "pleasure car" and not taxi insurance. D
knew that P required taxi insurance and was insisting upon it, but with-
out securing it, accepted the balance of the payments due on the car.
The taxi was in a wreck and the insurance company refused to pay. P
sued D. Court held for P Its theory in this case was that the perform-
ance of all conditions precedent was necessary before the assignee could
